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Introduction
This study can be con-
sidered as a first attempt to
analyse the issue of non-
compliance in Turkish or-
ganic farming. The aim is
to find empirical evidence
for crops that could be
considered as increasing
the risk of non-compliance with the organic production
rules.
Organic Farming in Turkey is still a small sector but is
growing steadily over the last years, mainly driven from ex-
port of typical Turkish products like raisins, fruit, and veg-
etables. Small farms are “intrinsically organic”, so they can
more easily be converted from a technical point of view
than large farms, but their small dimension in many cases
does not allow bearing the additional costs of certification.
For this reason small organic operators are often organised
as collective “projects” to share the cost of certification
(Sayin et al., 2005).
The Turkish Association of Organic Agriculture Move-
ment (ETO) can be considered a main actor for the devel-
opment of the organic sector in Turkey. Given that the
largest part of organic production is exported to Europe and
that the EU organic regulations have been taken as a refer-
ence by the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Af-
fairs, it is no surprise that six of the seven authorized com-
panies in Turkey for organic certification are from Europe
(Olhan et al., 2005).
In this paper we analyse archives from two control bodies
concerning the results of sampling procedures of organic
products. We want to analyse if the farms that are compli-
ant with the organic production rules are different from
those that are not compliant. This could help in designing
more efficient inspection schemes, which could reduce the
cost of certification, considered as a main obstacle for the
competitiveness of Turk-
ish organic farms (Rehber
and Turhan, 2002). Given
the available information,
our analysis refers to pos-
sible differences between
compliant and non-com-
pliant farms, using a statis-
tical testing based on the
comparison of the propor-
tion of crops produced. In what follows we consider an op-
erator as non-compliant if he/she has received a sanction.
Data and methods are described in the second section, re-
sults and discussion are shown in the third and fourth sec-
tion, and the conclusions terminate the paper.
Material and Methods
Data are obtained from a sample of farms certified by t-
wo control bodies (which will be referred to as Control
Body 1 and Control Body 2) in the period 2008-2009. The
structure of the data archives for Turkey is quite different
from that generally used for Western Europe countries. Ba-
sically two types of information are available: one referring
to structural information for the certified farmers and
processors and one referring to the sampling procedures
implemented by the control bodies, that are used to check
for possible non-compliances. Samples are taken from ei-
ther unprocessed or processed products, and are submitted
to appropriate laboratory analyses to check for use of chem-
icals in contrast with the organic regulation. If the samples
result positive to illegal substances, a cross-check is done
by analysing further samples: if the use of illegal substances
is confirmed, the farmer/processors are considered non-
compliant with the organic regulation and are sanctioned by
de-certifying the whole product lot. In more severe cases,
the whole farm/operator is excluded from further certifica-
tion.
The number of inspected farms and the respective share
of sanctioned farms are shown in Table 1.
The number of farms inspected by the two control bodies
increases in the 2008-2009 period, and the share of sanc-
tioned farms is not constant between the two datasets and
through the two years. The share of sanctioned farms in
2008 for Control Body1 is particularly high. The wide vari-
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ability of the datasets is confirmed by the information
shown in Table 2. Data from Control Body 1 shows a strong
increase in the average size from 2008 to 2009, and an in-
crease of the standard deviations. This is due to the inclu-
sion of particularly large farms in the dataset, which are
however not sampled, yielding a stable average size in the
sampled farms. The situation for Control Body 2 is more
stable between 2008 and 2009 for what concerns the aver-
age UAA size of total and sampled farms, but the size of
sanctioned farms is particularly high in 2009. The high val-
ues of standard deviations confirm the general dispersion of
data in both the datasets, which should be taken into consid-
eration when interpreting the results of the analysis of poten-
tial determinants of non-compliance. With the exception of
dimensional aspects, the differences between the two
datasets are much lower for what concerns other structural
aspects. The average age of the farmers is 54 and 51 respec-
tively for Control Body 1 and Control Body 2; more than
90% of farmers are male in both datasets. Also, more than
40% of farms in both datasets only produce one type of crop.
The most common crop types in both datasets are fruit, nuts,
grapes, olives and vegetables (for Control Body 2 only).
We wanted to test if the occurrence of sanctions is more
likely when some crops are produced. We have therefore con-
sidered the sampled farms, and distinguished between those
that after the inspection received a sanction from those that
did not. For the two groups of farms (sanctioned and not sanc-
tioned), we have measured the proportion of farms with a spe-
cific crop, and with land in conversion. This allows testing for
possible differences in the proportions of crops produced in
the two groups of farms. The proportion test is based on large
sample statistics and considers as a null hypothesis that there
is no difference in the proportion of the two groups (Wang,
2000; Acock 2008). The test is based on the following as-
sumptions:
– samples are taken randomly;
– each sample can result only in two possible outcomes:
sanction yes or no;
– samples are taken from a large population (i.e. the number
of sampled farm is much smaller than the total population).
Here we compare two proportions: pi1 referring to the
proportion of sanctioned farms producing the i-th crop, and
pi2, referring to the proportion of non-sanctioned farms pro-
ducing the i-th crop. A large sample confidence interval (1-
α) for the difference of two proportions can be defined as:
where:
pˆij = 1, pˆij, j =1, 2, and z is the value of the inverse normal
distribution, given the sample size and the significance lev-
el. A test of difference of the two proportions pi1 and pi2 is
defined as:
where and xi1 and xi2 are respectively the total
number of sanctioned and non sanctioned farms producing
the i-th crop.
Results
Table 3 shows the results of the proportion tests. Figures
represent the percentage of farms producing the specific
crops in the two groups of sanctioned and non-sanctioned
farms. The aim is to analyse if the proportion of sanctioned
farms is higher if they produce a specific crop. As we do not
have information directly associating crops and sanctions
(we do not know if a sanction was originated by a specific
crop production), we can only associate the sanction occur-
rence with the crop structure of a farm. Therefore we can
measure if the proportion of, say, farms producing nuts is
statistically higher for sanctioned farms. In this example we
can only conclude that sanction’s occurrence is higher for
farms producing nuts, but nuts production is not necessari-
ly the one causing sanctions, as these could be due to other
crops produced in the farm. Figures in bold refer to crops
that have a significantly different proportion between sanc-
tioned and non-sanctioned farms. In these cases, if the pro-
portion of a crop is higher for the sanctioned farm, then we
can conclude that this crop significantly increase the risk of
sanctions, and vice versa. For example, the average of
farms producing nuts in 2008 is significantly higher for the
sanctioned farms of the Control Body 1, while it is higher
for non-sanctioned farms of the Control Body 2.
Discussion
Results from Table 3 show a different situation from the
sampling outcomes of the two control bodies. In particular
the comparison of proportion of crops from Control Body 1
looks variable between 2008 and 2009, probably due to a
general change of the certified farms and of the sample
characteristics. Two crops show a statistically significant
difference in proportions between sanctioned and non-sanc-
tioned farms for both 2008 and 2009: herbs and vegetables.
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Control Body 1 Control Body 2 
2008 2009 2008 2009 
Total Farms 960 1,397 1,911 2,816 
Sampled farms 140 284 434 510 
of which sanctioned 52 (37%) 6 (2%) 19 (2%) 31 (6%) 
 
Table 1 - Number of farms and non-compliances by year and control body.
Control Body 1 Control Body 2 
Total 
farms 
Sampled 
farms 
Sanctioned 
farms 
Total 
farms 
Sampled 
farms 
Sanctioned 
farms 
Average UAA, 2008 (ha) 9.8 3.0 1.6 8.8 18.3 11.3 
std dev 21.2 5.1 1.1 44.7 91.4 12.2 
Average UAA, 2009 (ha) 29.0 5.1 7.7 7.1 17.5 54.6 
std dev 613.7 7.2 6.1 32.7 72.7 172.8 
 
Table 2 - Utilisable arable area: total, sampled and sanctioned farms.
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However, in both cases the results are opposite for the two
years: the proportion of sanctioned farms producing vegeta-
bles is significantly higher in 2008, and is lower in 2009. The
opposite results apply to herbs. Finally, the proportion of
farms with nuts and fallow land is higher for sanctioned farms
but only for 2008. The situation referring to Control Body 2
looks more consistent across the two years. Sanctioned farms
are consistently showing a higher proportion of industrial
crops, vegetables and in-conversion land for both years. The
relevance of vegetables for sanctioned farms is the only one
for which some analogy between the two control bodies can
be found, even if the results are not consistent through time.
Sanctioned farms are also showing a higher proportion of cit-
rus and other arable crops, but only in 2009. Also interesting
for what concerns Control Body 2, is the higher share of sanc-
tions associated to the land under conversion, and to industri-
al crops production for both years. Unfortunately there is no
literature on the issue of non-compliance in the organic sector
in Turkey, to make any comparison of results. We can how-
ever refer to similar analysis made for Italy (Gambelli et al.,
2011a, Gambelli et al., 2011b). Despite the obvious structural
differences between the two countries, the Italian case pro-
vides relevant information for Mediterranean organic pro-
duction, which will be used as a benchmark for the main
findings of the analysis of the Turkish organic farms. On
one hand, in Italian organic farms olives, fruit, and citrus
production are associated to a reduction of the risk of non-
compliance, a result analogous to the proportion test based
on Control Body 2 data. On the other hand, the higher risk
of non-compliance of farms producing vegetables and ex-
hibiting non-organic land is consistent with the results from
the Italian situation, too.
Conclusions
Non-compliance in organic farming is still a
topic not well explored. Very little literature ex-
ists, and even the practitioner’s approaches are
few and not well documented.
Results of this study show some regularities
but also many inconsistencies between the two
datasets, and through time which limits general-
isations. Vegetable production is the only prod-
uct showing evidence for both Control Bodies
(though not for all years) of a higher share of
sanctions.
On the other hand, a higher proportion of non-
sanctioned farms is referring to fruit for both
2008 and 2009, and to olives and nuts in 2008,
though these results are only referring to one
Control Body. Fruits and nuts represent the
main organic production in Turkey (Sayne et al.
2005). Results concerning the relatively lower
risk of sanctions associated to these products represent
therefore a positive aspect in terms of development of ex-
port potentials. These results are also relevant for what con-
cerns the domestic demand for organic products. Our re-
sults, though partially, indicate a rather reassuring situation
concerning the risk of non-compliance, and therefore the
overall quality, at least for the main Turkish organic prod-
ucts. Akgüngör et al. (2010) show a relevant interest of ur-
ban Turkish consumers for certified organic products, and
considerable concern for aspects like health and hygienic
characteristics of the products, while İlyasoğlu et al., (2010),
show how Turkish consumers confidence in organic food is
still moderate. Given these considerations, the potential of a
reliable and efficient certification system seems particularly
relevant. The development of domestic consumption for or-
ganic products puts the basis for the diversification of the de-
mand for organic products, making the sector depending not
only on export. However this should be considered only a
preliminary insight on these issues, and the variability of the
sample of data, and of results clearly show the need for fur-
ther analysis, and data collection.
In term of policy, the implications of this study are t-
wofold. On one hand, a more structured framework to guide
risk-based inspections and sampling is advisable, and this
would need some additional information at the operator’s
level, as it is reasonable to expect that structural data alone
cannot completely explain non-compliant behaviours. On
the other hand, the Turkish inspection system appears quite
advanced and well integrated in the EU system. A transition
from a full equivalent certification system into the current
EU-wide system – in case of Turkey accession to the EU –
would not be so difficult.
Acknowledgment
This publication was generated as part of the CERTCOST
Project, agreement no. 207727 (http://www.certcost.org),
76
Control Body 1 Control Body 2 
2008 2009 2008 2009 
Crops  
Sanction
Yes 
Sanction 
No
Sanction 
Yes 
Sanction 
No
Sanction 
Yes 
Sanction 
No
Sanction 
Yes 
Sanction 
No
Cereals  0.08 0.10 0.33 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.15 
Dried pulses 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.06 
Root crops 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ind.  crops 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.21*** 0.02*** 0.16*** 0.01*** 
Herbs   0** 0.09** 0.66*** 0.05*** 0.21 0.11 0.19 0.18 
Green fodder  0.00 0.02 0.33 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 
Other arable 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.16*** 0.04*** 
Perm. grass. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Fruit   0.85 0.84 1.00 0.74 0*** 0.27*** 0.13** 0.31** 
Nuts   0.25*** 0.04*** 0.00 0.12 0*** 0.27*** 0.13 0.22 
Citrus   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.26*** 0.002*** 
Grapes   0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.37 0.30 0.13 0.25 
Olives   0.00 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.05* 0.24* 0.13 0.23 
Fallow land 0.19*** 0.03*** 0.17 0.06 0.16 0.11 0* 0.09* 
Vegetables   0.96*** 0.44*** 0** 0.46** 0.21** 0.07** 0.13*** 0.03*** 
Land in conv. 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.64 0.42** 0.18** 0.74*** 0.16*** 
Table 3 - Proportions of crops for sanctioned and non-sanctioned farms, and re-
spective results of proportion test.
Significance levels: * 0.1 ≤ p < 0.05; ** 0.05 ≤ p < 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001.
3 To our knowledge the only systematic – yet a priori, non-empir-
ical – approach to non-compliance risk assessment is that of Ac-
credia (2009).
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